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OF THE EUROPEAN U N IO N ?1
I. Starting Point
After the Second World War, the future of Europe was a burning question. Al­
though the original verve of setting out has, in the meantime, given way to bureau­
cratic practice and national state power, the pressing question remains: What shall 
become of Europe?
The reasons for this question are the following:
• objectives of the European Union and Community include an increasingly close 
integration -  that is a challenge for the national states;
• globalization of the common foreign and security policy calls for powers of deci­
sion -  a challenge for the ability of politics and policy;
• increasing integration and the expansion2 of the Union become problems of the 
structure of union, administration, and decision-making -  a challenge for the Euro­
pean constitutional authority.
The foundation of the European Union is generally known to be but “a new stage 
in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” -  Art. 
1 section 2 of the Treaty on European Union. The “integration” of the Union is 
supposed to be caused by a “process”, but the objective of the integration is not yet 
to be seen. Art. 2 of the Treaty on European Union claims an “identity” of the Un­
ion as far as foreign and security policy are concerned, which actually requires an 
internal identity. But the contours of this identity are blurred, although Art. 3 sec-
* Na życzenie Autora przypisy zostały zamieszczone w języku niemieckim,
' The article was submitted before any approval of the text of the European Constitution.
2 Cf. Europlische Kommission, Strategiepapier zur Erweiterung. Bericht liber die Fortschritte jedes Be- 
werberlandes auf dem Weg zum Beitritt -  KOM (2000) 700, in: Bulletin der EuropSischen Union, Beilage 3/2000.
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tion 1 of the Treaty on European Union declares a “single institutional framework”. 
No wonder that there is speculation about the “finality of Europe”.
Up to now, the European Union is an association of European states under 
international law, organized as a community of values, justice, and objectives:
The closeness of their integration reflects a success story:
• foundation of the European communities,
• establishment of the Common Market and of the economic and monetary union,
• introduction of a “political Union” through the implementation of a common foreign 
and security policy, defence policy, and justice policy,
• development of the citizenship of the Union as a basis of a “Europe of the citi­
zens” in an “area of freedom, security, and justice”.
The common possession, the “acquis communautaire”, which these events 
have produced, is rich and constitutes a major obstacle for the joining candidates. It 
reflects the existing closeness of the integration, but not its future, because, ac­
cording to Art. 2 of the Treaty on European Union, the objective of the Union is 
not only the “full maintenance” but moreover the “development” of this posses­
sion. That also includes the extension of the “institutional framework”.
Because of the Treaty of Nice3 and the Declaration of Laeken4, the “future 
of Europe” has, in the meantime, been brought on a constitutional way: In Brussels, 
the “Convent for the future of the European Union” under the presidency of Gis­
card d’Estaing5 has continued to meet since February 28, 2002 to draw up a draft of 
the Constitution of the Union. All eyes are now turned towards the convention of 
the European Council in the year 2004, when the decision on the basic reform of 
the Union, which had been postponed in Amsterdam and Nice, is to be made. By 
that time, a broad public discussion is planned in which the applying states will be 
included6.
II. Horizons of Development
Which fields of discussion will be opened to the public until then? To what hori­
zons of development of the Union do we have to adjust?
1. The basis of the Union
The text of the Treaty on European Union does not make final statements about the 
future of the Union, but at the same time holds on to the fundamental “principles”
’ 26.02.2001, ABI. C 80/01, Anhang: ErklSrung 23 Ziff. 3 ff. -  C 80/85, Bulletin der EuropSischen Union 
1/2-2001 Ziff. 1.1.1. Zum Stand des Ratifikationsverfahrens vgl. http://europa.eu.int/comm/niee_treaty {Stand: 
17.07.2002); in Deutschland haben der Bundestag am 18.10.2001, der Bundesrat am 09.11.2001 zugestimmt und 
der Bundesprasident am 21.12.2001 unterzeichnet; die Hinterlegung ist am 11.02.2002 erfolgt.
4 Erklarung des EuropMischen Rats vom Dezember 2001: Bulletin der EuropSischen Union 12/2001, Ziff, 1.27.
5 Vgl. zur Zusammensetzung u. Arbeitsweise Bulletin der EuropMischen Union 1/2-2002, S. 9, zum Bera- 
tungsablauf: Bulletin 12/2001, S. 25: das ,,Abschlussdokument“ des Konventes soli ,,Ausgangspunkt“ fiir die „Ar­
beit der kUnftigen Regierungskonferenz“ sein, die „endgtiltige Besehlllsse“ fasst.
6 ErklMrung 23 Ziff. 3 zum Vertrag von Nizza (Vgl. Fn. 2).
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on which the Union is founded -  Art. 6 of the Treaty on European Union -  and the 
observance of which is required from the Member States: liberty, democracy, re­
spect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. Those prin­
ciples define the constitutional homogeneous state of the community of states. The 
Treaty does not speak of a pre-contractual homogeneous state similar to the one 
assumed of the German people by the Federal Constitutional Court7. The question 
whether Turkey is lacking the “European” quality not only geographically but also 
.sodo-culturally, as is now under discussion because of the increased pressure to 
admittance, can only be answered politically, maybe geo-strategically, but not le­
gally. At the same time, it is an advantage of the Union that it is a politically open 
community of states dedicated to peace and progress. One could recommend to the 
Union the “unkempt thoughts” of Stanisław Jerzy Lec: “Some backgrounds [in the 
Polish language synonymous to ‘reasons’] tolerate no foregrounds”.
2. The Question of Structure
Nevertheless -  or possibly: thanks to this -  the legal nature of the Union is still 
controversial8 so that the constitutional process is accompanied by institutional 
problems of structure.
Whether Europe will finally find the structure of a federal state9, a state- 
alliance10, any kind of federation of “mother countries” following the model of the 
compromise of Luxembourg of 1966“ or whether it will continue as a personally- 
territorially concentrated “constitutional alliance”12 or only as a legal community 
sui generis consisting of multiple states, does not depend on theories but on the 
constellations of Europe’s forming powers and on the progress of the integration 
itself, because Art. 1 section 2 of the Treaty on the European Union took back eta- 
tistic visions on an open development process, the course of which has essentially 
produced an independent functional corporation of the Member States.
Art. 281 of the Treaty establishing the European Community therefore at­
tributes to the Community a legal personality of its own while the European Union 
so far does not have such a qualification. Now the European Parliament as well as 
the committee speak for the granting (not: the acknowledgement) of a legal person­
ality to the Union'3 so that the Union can come out of the shadow of its Member 
States and the Communities, and can, even under international law, unfold as the
7 BVerfGE 89, S. 155, 186,
I Cf. Bieber in: Beutler/Bieber/Pipkom/Streil, Die Europaische Union, 5. Aufl. 2001, S. 59 f,; air Entwicklungs- 
geschichte Oppermann, Europarecht, 2. Aufl. 1999, S, 13 ff.
* Hallstein, Der unvollendete Bundesstaat, 1969.
10 BVerfGE 89, S. 155, 185; von Bodandy, Supranationaler Forderalismus als Wirklichkeit und idee einer 
neuen Herrschaftsform, 1999, S. 11 ff.
II Vom 28.01.1966, Text in: Europarecht (EuR) 1966, S. 79, auszugsweise in: Beutler/Bieber/Pipkom/Streil (Fn. 
7), S. 162; zu de Gaulles’ fbderatives „Europa der Vaterlander" vgl das Zitat von 1960 in: Oppermann (Fh. 7), S. 14.
12 Von Bogdandy (Fn. 9), S. 13, 29 ff.
11 „Vergabe" laut Kommission: Bulletin der Europaischen Union 5/2002, S. 7 f.; EntschlieBung des Eu- 
ropSischen Parlaments vom 14.03.2002, Bulletin der Europaischen Union 3/2002, S. 41 f.
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policy maker that it is supposed to become according to the Treaty of Nice14, with­
out questioning the sovereignty of the Member States by its own sovereignty. Ac­
cording to Community law, the Union and its constitutional system could then 
precede the Communities.
3. The Constitutional Question
This calls for a qualified answer to the constitutional question which so far has 
been postponed.
The question refers to the ideas of the modem constitutional state and just 
therefore gives rise to worries about etatism with the Euro-federalists. The Euro­
pean Court of Justice, however, has not been afraid of calling the foundation trea­
ties of the Union a “constitutional document”'5. Persons with a background in con­
stitutional history who know the legal nature of the Peace of Westphalia of 164816 
are not astonished at the fact that transformed treaties have this meaning. In the 
meantime, the European discussion about the concept of a summarizing constitu­
tional treaty for the Union, that is a codification treaty to which the Member States 
have to give their approval, has progressed.
In comparison to a state-constitution a Union-constitution cannot naturally 
provide a codification which covers the political system and the civic society and is 
complete and compulsory for all because the Union is still in the progress of be­
coming something and has neither omnipotence nor sovereignty. A constitutional 
treaty therefore cannot fulfil all constitutional functions required for a state17.
Because the fundamental decisions for democracy and the rule of law have 
already been put into place18, the constitutional convent must now provide them 
with a shape. As far as legal techniques are concerned, the first thing to do is the 
simplification of the now relatively intricate community treaties19; this simplifica­
tion could at least lead to a constitutional “system” whose following interpretation 
will lead to the “finding out of the reasonable”20 and thus to a systematic unity. The 
constitutional order goes further. The convent is supposed to establish regulations 
of competence corresponding to the principle of subsidiarity, to consider the “role 
of the national parliaments within the architecture of Europe”21 and to settle the
14 Vgl. Erklarungen 1 und 2, Anhang zum Vertrag (Fn. 2).Skeptisch Pins, Hat die Europaische Union eine 
Verfassung? Braucht sie eine? In: EuR 2000, S. 311 ,335ff,
13 EuGH, Gutachten 1/91 (Europaischer Wirtschaftsraum), Slg. 1991, S. 1-60, 79; zur Entwicklung und B- 
egrtindung dieser Rechtsprechung vgl. Piris (Fn. 23), EuR 2002, S. 311, 314 ff.
“ Cf. Grawert, Gesetz, in: Brtmner/Conze/Koselleek (Hrsg.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, Bd. 2, 1975, 
S. 863,877 ff.
17 Cf. Grawert, Funktionen der Landesverfassung NRW im gesamtstaatlichen Gefilge der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, in: Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Nordrhein-Westfalen. Festschrift zum 50-jIhrigen Bestehen des 
Verfassungsgerichtshofs fUr das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2002, S. 153,155 ff.
18 Zum Begriff der Verfassung als Grundentschtidung vgl. C. Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 3. Aufl. 1928/1957,
S. 23.
19 Vertrag von Nizza (Fn. 2), Anhang: ErklSrung 23 Ziff. 5 (Abl. C 80/85 f.).
“ Hegel, Grundlinien des Philosophic des Rechts, Vortede XIX, hrsg. Hoffmeister, 4. Aufl. 1955, S. 14.
21 Vgl. zur Differenzierung dieses Problems den Fragenkatalog des Presidiums des Konvents vom 31.05.2002:
Europaischer Konvent / Sekretariat, CONV 68/02 (http://register.ccmsUium.eu.int/pdf/de/02/cv0G/00068d2.).
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status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union because this 
work, which has also been made by a convent, is not yet legally binding22 but, in the 
case of its being put into force, it will compete with the fundamental freedoms of 
community law, with the jurisdiction of the basic human rights of the European 
Court of Justice and with the European Convention on Human Rights23. Moreover, 
the institutional structure24 and the decision-making process25 have to be reformed.
4. The Question of Government
Now comes the question of government. It aims at the efficiency of the 
“functioning of the institutions”, declared desirable in the Preamble of the Treaty 
on European Union.
Now and in the foreseeable future, this question focuses the question of 
structure and of constitution because the answer to it will determine the structure of 
power within Europe and therefore the mechanism of integration. Whether the 
Member States, and for them their governments For Them, or the “peoples”, and 
their parliaments for them including the political parties, or whether the European 
common institutions as supra-national institutions will move to the centre of the 
European relations of power, this decision will be the most important one since 
Europe’s future is determined by procedures and methods, not by visions.
Thus, we have come to the ideas about the Corporate Governance of the 
Union in the future.
III. Corporate Governance of Europe
Corporate Governance is a business term that denotes, in a general sense, exercis­
ing power within a corporation26. In this sense, the economic and social committee 
made the relationship of administration and citizens within the Union a subject as 
far as legitimization, participation, consultation and subsidiarity are concerned27.
a Vgl. dazu Suerbaum, Die Schutzpflichtdimension der Gemeinschaftsgrundrechte, EuR 2003 (erscheint 
demnichst); Pache, Die Europaische Grundrechtscharta -  ein Riickschritt fur den Grundrechtsschutz in Europa? 
In: EuR 2001, S.475 ff.
n Seitens des Europarats isl der Verfassungskonvent dringlich auf die Kompetenz des Europarats und des 
EuropSischen Gerichtshofs fur Menschenrechte fiir Fragen der Menschenrechte und Demokralie hingewiesen 
warden; vgl. Resolution Parliamentary Assembly des Europarats 1290 (2002) in: Europaischer Konvent/Se- 
kretariat, Ubermittlungsvermerk vom 17.07.2002, CONV 193/02.
24 Vgl. Europaische Kommission, Institutionelle Reform fiir eine erfolgreiche Erweiterung. Stellungnahme 
der Kommission nach Artikel 48 des Vertrages ttber die Europaische Union zur Einberufung einer Konferenz der 
Vertreter der Regierungen der Mitgliedstaaten im Hinblick auf die Anderung der Vertrage, in: Bulletin der Eu- 
ropSischen Union, Beilage 2/2000.
“ Cf. Antrag Di Rupo u.a. an das Presidium des Konvents: Europaischer Konvent/Sekretariat, Ubermitt­
lungsvermerk vom 10.07.2002, CONV 181/02.
“ Cf. Reb&ioux, European Style of Corporate Governance at the Crossroads: The Role of Worker In­
volvement, in: Journal of Common Market Studies (JCMS) 2002, S. 111.
” Initiativstellungnahme des Wirtschafts- und Sozialausschusses vom 25.04.2001: „Die organisierte 
Zivilgesellschaft und europaische Governance** (http://europa.eu.int/comm/nice_treaty/index:de.htm).
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Naturally, the committee took the existing order of competence and the institu­
tional order for granted as well.
1. The Order of Competence
The pressure which the coming expansion of the Union will cause for the effi­
ciency of its institutions and for their ability to govern has led to stronger efforts to 
outline the principle of closeness to the citizens and the principle of subsidiarity 
more clearly -  Art. 1 section 2, Art. 2 phrase 2 of the Treaty on European Union. 
Even until now the principle of special authorization could not do enough to slow 
down the standardizing urge for perfection of the supra-national legislation. As a con­
sequence, the national parliaments had to fulfil this hopeless duty which only brought 
about routine of transformation but no increase of participation and legitimation. Now 
all hopes are for the strict marking off of competences between the Union and the 
Member States which, in Germany, is in vain expected by the federal states from 
the legislation of the Grundgesetz. In addition, the committee of the regions de­
mands that the principle of subsidiarity resulting from Art. 5 of the Treaty estab­
lishing the European Community is extended to the regions and communities2*. We 
will see which shall prevail: the vital tendency towards equality of living condi­
tions or the rational standard.
This problem, however, will not only occupy the constitutional convent 
which is in session but moreover the future interpretation of the treaty, and it will 
thus pose the question of the authorization for the interpretation. If the marking off 
of competence is acknowledged as a legal question, it must obviously be handed 
over to the European Court of Justice; if the marking off is rated as a political 
question, the European Council comes into question as judging instance, following 
the model of the Bundestag/Lower House of German Parliament of 1815 and of the 
Bundesrat/Upper House of German Parliament of 1817: This way, the Member 
States could practice a remnant of “control” over the treaties29.
If the marking off and the relief of the Union turn out well, the institutions 
of the Union whose ability to decide has come, through the expansion, across 
a critical limit, could draw profit from that. Therefore, the order of competence 
does not only logically take precedence over the institutional order, but it is also 
closely connected with the institutional order.
2. Experiences with Integration and Maxims of Organization
What requests must the political system of the Union be adequate in the future? 
The answer is not easy because there are historically-based theories of the state but 
there is no consistent theory of Union and because the Member States have an un­
derstanding of their selves that does not allow a homogeneous concept.
" Cf. Antrag vom 13.03.2002: Bulletin der EuropMischen Union 3/2002, S. 41. 
» BVerfGE 89, S. 155, 190.
The existing Community Treaties at least provide for the fundamental “principles”, 
the principle of integration and the criterion of efficiency. Moreover, the Treaty of 
Nice requires -  in a form typical for the treaty of authorization and of reservation 
of sovereignty -  a broader capacity for policy as far as questions of foreign affairs 
and questions of security are concerned”.
On the other hand, the existing deficits of organization are evident. Be­
cause the Union is committed to the principle of democracy and because the na­
tional constitutions such as the German Grundgesetz demand structural homogen- 
ity31, the problem of the democratic legitimation increases while the Union 
coalesces into a community. As long as the Commission played its role as “motor” 
of the integration, the Commission was the first object of criticism. In the mean­
time, the criticism must also be held against the Council of the Community and the 
European Council of the Union because these institutions decide not only on es­
sential political matters but also decide on objective issues supra-nationally.
Compared to this, the participation of citizens has developed only margin­
ally as far as individual law is concerned. At least the parliamentization of those 
institutions has progressed considerably. It appears in the rights of the European 
Parliament of advising, hearing, deciding, approving and controlling, the partici­
pation in the legislation -  Art. 251, Art. 161 of the Treaty establishing the Euro­
pean Community -  and in the adoption of the budget -  Art. 272 of the Treaty es­
tablishing the European Community -  as well as in the filling of the positions of 
the commissioners -  Art. 21432, Art. 201 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community.
Nevertheless, we cannot speak of a parliamentary-democratic governmen­
tal system. The European Parliament has not assumed the position of the leading 
representative institution, legitimizing institution, decision-making institution, and 
controlling institution yet. Followed from direct elections differentiated within the 
several national states without lists of candidates for the whole of Europe33, its 626 
members of parliament -  after the expansion: up to 732 members of parliament34 -  
do not represent a unified European people but the variety of the peoples of 
Europe. And this representation is not actually proportional but follows the princi­
ple of the so-called degressive proportionality which mixes up the number of state- 
peoples and the number of citizens in the Member states33. Neither the Parliament 
nor the European unions of parties organized within the Parliament have so far 
been able to produce a Europe-wide Union-consciousness.
Apart from that, the power of legitimization of the European Parliament 
does not reach that of the committees of the heads of the states and the representa­
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30 Cf. Art. 17, 23 bis 27e EUV neuer Fassung (Fn. 2).
91 Cf. Art. 23 I 1 GG und BVerfGE 89, S. 155, 183 ff; Pemice in: Dreier (HRSG.).Grundgesetz, Kom- 
mentar, Bd. II, 1998, Art. 23 Rn, 51 ff.
“ Anderung dureh den Vertrag von Nizza (Fn. 2).
” Solche Listen werden von der Kommission vorgeschlagen: vgl. deren Stellungnahme „Institutionelie 
Reform fiir eine erfolgreiche Erweiterung" (Fn. 23), S. 9.
14 Cf. Europaische Kommission, Institutionelie Reform fiir eine erfolgreiche Erweiterung (Fn. 23), S. 7 ff. Ho-
chstzahl von 700 Abgeordneten.
5S Zur Neubestimmung vgl. den Vertrag von Nizza, Anlage (Fn. 2), Tabelle zur Erklarung 20.
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tives of the governments. Therefore, the democratic legitimization34 of the institu­
tions of the Union and the work of the Union are in a position of imbalance.
The correction of this imbalance, on the other hand, requires guiding ideas 
about “good government”. According to which concept?
Those who believe in a homogeneous Europe complain chiefly about the 
lack of the summarization of the “peoples” into one people of the citizens of the 
Union. So far, citizens occupy only individual-legal positions -  Art. 19, 21, 194 of 
the Treaty establishing the European Community: the right to vote and petition 
within the limits of the Community, but do not constitute a voting people”. Seen 
this way, the European Parliament appears only as a stage of integration on its way 
to a future group of representation resulting from a Europe-wide common propor­
tional representation which does not consider the differences between the national 
states.
On the other hand, whoever considers the relations of power of the Mem­
ber States and of their own interests will reject this idea as illusory. The German 
Federal Constitutional Court even regards that idea as unacceptable because of 
constitutional reasons3®. It is also worried by France’s insistence on the unity and 
indivisibility of the Republic* and by the sovereignty of the British Parliament40. 
Seen this way, the European Parliament and the Council receive legitimation from 
the allied “peoples”, since their mediated members elect the citizens of the Union 
to the European Parliament. However, this construction must be satisfied in cases 
of decisions of the majority with a decentralized virtual responsibility.
For that reason, there is, on the one hand, the proposal to involve the na­
tional parliaments more strongly in the existing process of integration. To this, the 
President of the Convention, Giscard d’Estaing, has contributed the idea to let the 
members of the European Parliament and of the state parliaments hold a meeting as 
“congress” once a year, but it is not clear what this crowd should effect. On the 
other hand, the Union-internal parliamentarization of the Commission'" and of the 
Council are to be improved, meaning: more effective competence of participation 
and control for the European Parliament.
The resulting view of the parliamentary governmental system which exists 
within the Union is not explained in any definite state-constitution or constitutional 
doctrine, but only by a rating comparison of the national constitutional systems 
with the help of the union-legal requirements, as was done while developing union-
36 Zur Notwendigkeit effektiver demokratischer Legitimation fur alle Austifaung der Staatsgewalt vgl. E.-W. B5- 
ckenforde, Demokratie als Verfassungsprinzip, in: Isensee/Kirchhof, Handbueh des Staatsreehts, Bd. I, 2. Auifl. 1995, 
S. 887, 894 f. (Rn. U ff.).
” Deshalb sind Europalisten fiir die Wahlen zum Europaischen Parlament problematisch.
» BVerfGE 89, S. 155, 184 ff.
” Seit der Proklamation vom 24.09.1792, jetzt Art. I der Verfassung der Republik Frankreich von 1958; dazu 
Pactet, Institutions politiques. Droit constitutionnel, 14. ćd. 1995, S. 346 ff.; femer Chantebout, Droit Constitutionnel et 
SchiencePolitique, ll.ed . 1994, S. 65f.,78.
40 Cf. Bogdanor in:Jowell/01iver (Hrsg.), The Changing Constitution, 3. ed.1994, S. 3, 5 ff.; dagegen die 
Frage von Bradley, The Sovereignty of Parliament -  in Perpetuity? In: Joweil /  Oliver, a.a.O., S .79,90 ff.
41 Ministerprasident des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen Clement, Eine neue Architektur fiir das Haus Euro­
pa, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 267 vom 16.11.2001, S. 10.
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legal standards of basic human rights. This work still has to be done42. The result 
will be a mixture of the parliamentary, presidial, chancellor and collegial systems 
already existing in Europe, within which the participation of the Parliament in the 
governing of the Union can concentrate on certain important but not necessarily all 
decisions43. In any case the union-legal principle of democracy necessitates the 
establishment of the Parliament not only as a participant in debates but as a leading 
decision-making institution for essential matters. This position does not exclude the 
decision-making competence of other (and perhaps otherwise authorized) institu­
tions of the Union.
However, the plans to move the Parliament into the center of the European 
decision-making processes are still met with the objection that the structure of the 
parties of the Union and of the European Parliament and the attitudes of the mem­
bers of the Parliament at this time are not ready for a leading role in Europe. Com­
pared with national experiences, the European Parliament can thus acquire the im­
age of a Europe-wide body of representatives which is situated close to the citizens 
only within the limits of a European media community whose development, how­
ever, because of structural and language-reasons, is still distant.
More important is the objection that the Union must, for reasons of na­
tional constitutional law, at least partly and continually, be based on the legitimiza­
tion of the founding and Member States if this legitimization is not to escape from 
under their “control”. Not only does the political good sense call for respect for this 
objection44; it is rather the belief in the openness of the integration process that ex­
cludes its aiming at a union. Thus, the European Council and the Council of the 
Community remain players on an equal footing with the Parliament. For reasons of 
legitimization and efficiency, the idea to unite both Councils is obvious.
3. The Evaluation of the Governmental Structure
This having been said, attention should now be directed to the to the structure of the 
European government in the future: government in its narrower sense seen as a com­
posite of the institutions and competences for leadership of the current political deci­
sion-making processes including the leadership of the executive administration. Essen­
tially, the questions are whether and where the political leadership is to be situated, 
how the politics of the Union can be stabilized and how European politics and bureauc­
racy can be brought to a balance of powers according to the rule of law.
41 Eine gute Grundlage bieten Grewe / Fabri, Droits constitutionnels europeens, 1995; ergSnzend, aller- 
dings eher faktenreich als dogmatisch angelegt, die Sammlung von Staatenstudien in; lsmayr (Hrsg.), Die politi- 
schen Systeme Osteuropas, 2002.
" Cf. Grawert, Demokratische Regierungssysteme. QualitStsanforderungen an die Regierungssysteme der
Mitgiiedstaaten der Europaischen Union, in: Murswiek/Storost/Wolff (Hrsg.), Staat -  SouverSnitat -  Verfassung. 
Festschrift fiir Helmut Quaritsch zum 70.Geburtstag, 2000, S. 95 ff.; ders., Parlamentarismus in Europa -  Entwic- 
klungslinien und Systemstrukturen, in: Institut fUr Verfassungsforschung Bd. 12: Internationale Wissenschaftliche 
Konferenz 150 Jahre griechischen parlamentarischen Lebens 1844-1994, hrsg. Das Griechische Parlament (0b- 
ersetzung des Titels aus dem Griechischen), Athen 2000, S. 391 ff.
44 Der President der Republik Po len hat noch kiirzlich auf der Fortsetzung des intergouvemementalen In- 
teressenausgleichs bestanden: vgl. Frankfurter Atlgemeine Zeitung Nr. 281 vom 02.12.2002.
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Whoever is orientated on a party-political comparison of the governmental camp 
and the opposition regards the government as an action-committee of the majority 
of the Parliament and organizes cooperation and control according to the pattern of 
this relationship. This pattern, however, does not fit the Union. In the foreseeable 
future one must remember the already established, organized powers which on the 
one hand consist of the parties and governments of the Member States and on the 
other hand of the already integrated institutions of the Union, the Council and the 
Commission including their bureaucracy as the collection of specialized knowl­
edge. This constellation must be formed in the more distant future so that a legiti­
mate and effective governmental leadership within and outside the Union is guar­
anteed.
So far, the Commission considers itself “protector of the Treaties”45 and 
“motor” of the integration. Within this conception it can rely upon its supra­
national composition -  Art. 213, 214 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, now being included in the new version of the Treaty of Nice -  as well 
as upon its right of control and of taking legal action -  Art. 211, Art. 226 of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community -  and upon its monopoly of taking 
the legislative initiative -  Art. 250, 251 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community.
In the meantime, the arrangement of policies within the Union has to a high 
degree passed on to the heads of states and to other committees of representatives 
of the governments. Since Europe-politics have become domestic politics of the 
Member States -  one only has to consider the fact that economic law and social 
law are to a high degree Community law, the intra-govemmental communication 
dominates the area of decisions. According to Union-law, the competences of the 
Council to participate in the decision-making progress have been extended. It is 
also for the benefit of the Council that the Treaty of Nice has intensified the coop­
eration in foreign and security questions -  Art. 17, 25, 27a to 27e of the Treaty on 
European Union. Of these circumstances results the office of a General Secretariat 
-  Art. 207 section 2 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, which is 
under the control of “Secretary-General and High Representative for the common 
foreign and security policy”; the Treaty of Nice provides for the appointment of the 
Secretary General and his deputy by the Council with a qualified majority. Thus 
the Council is, in comparison with the Commission, a center of its own which will 
outlast introduction of changes concerning the representatives of the government.
It was, however, predictable that the Council will lose its ability to make 
decisions in the course of the expansion once there are 27 Members with 237 votes 
instead of the current 15 Members with 87 votes. The Treaty of Nice tries to pre­
45 Europaische Kommission, Institutionelie Reform fiir eine erfolgreiche Erweiterung (Fn. 23), 10, -  Der
Begriff nimmt wohl auf dessen Einfiihrung durch C. Schmitt Bezug: C. Schmitt, Das Reichsgerieht als Hilter der
Verfassung (1929), jetzt in: ders., Verfassungsrechtliche AufsStze aus den Jahren 1924-1954, 2. Aufl. 1973, S. 63 
ff. -  Fiir das Rechtsstaatsverstandnis interessant ist der Umstand, dass die Kommission sich und nicht den Euro­
paischen Gerichtshof als ,,HUter“ anerkennt. *
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vent this danger by providing a new distribution of seats, different weight of votes46 
and a new arrangement of the procedures. The new arrangement of the procedures 
had to show consideration for the relation between smaller and bigger Member 
States and in many cases for the way they see themselves -  sometimes over­
estimating their importance. In the future, at least 169 votes shall be needed for the 
acceptance of a proposal and 69 votes shall be sufficient to prevent the acceptance 
of a decision. Thus, decisions will be the results of complex calculations. Besides, 
the procedure is so complicated that its progress must be doubted47.
As far as we can see, there have been no proposals to reduce the Commit­
tee or divide it into sub-committees. The critical topic of the ability to make deci­
sions can only be improved by its tighter regulation and by the concentration of the 
heads of the states on things essential for the Union. From the procedural and legal 
point of view, it is important to put the principle of majority in force. There is no 
doubt about that, except for the fact that there are different opinions about the 
question as to which topics might be decided upon by a majority without substan­
tially restricting the sovereignty of the national states. It is doubtful whether the 
Council might be prevented from discussing detailed problems since in principle 
almost every topic can include a domestic political dimension as well as a party- 
political dimension48.
Therefore, the Council does not compete only with the Commission but 
also -  and mostly -  with the Parliament because the Council acts towards the Par­
liament with regard to its different structure of interests and legitimization. Dog­
matically and historically educated observers therefore foresee the European Par­
liament as the Unitarian division and the Council as the federative division of 
a collective leadership duo. In Germany, one naturally thinks of the cooperation of 
the Bundestag/Upper House of the German Parliament and Bundesrat/Upper House 
of the German Parliament. Implementation of such a construction into the Union 
would result in an integration-friendly balance of powers.
But this construction touches the essential questions of power: externally, it 
is questionable whether the Member States will take the position of the German 
federal states; internally, the distribution of the legislative and control competences 
are questionable.
Some reform-ideas seek to stabilize the Council as the actual government, 
having the competence to produce political guiding rules, and to empower the 
Commission only with lesser administrative functions because there are more and 
more doubts concerning the continuation of the Commission’s monopoly to initiate 
legislation49. Even now, the Council may demand the Commission to make investi­
gations and proposals, as stated in Art. 208 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community. If a parliamentary right to the initiative is established, the Commis-
“ Cf. Vertrag von Nizza {Fn. 2), Anhang: Erklarungen 20 samt Tabellen (Verteilung), 21 (Verfahren, 
Mehrheitsprinzip) und 22 (Tagungsort).
45 EuropMisches Parlament, EntschlieBung vom 31.05.2002, in: Bulletin der Europaischen Union 5/2002, S. 1.
41 These von C. Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, 1932/1963, S. 38 f., dessen Freund-Feind-Abgrenzung hier 
allerdings nicht hilfreich ist.
49 Cf. u.a. BUnder/Friedrich in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 204 vom 03.09.2002.
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sion will lack essential parts of its competences necessary for it to be the “motor” 
of integration. If the Commission is only a part of a governmental system which is 
ruled by the Parliament and the Council, it will lose the power to shape a supra­
national common spirit.
Perhaps the reforms introduced by the Treaty of Nice give the Commission 
a new weight. From January 1, 2005 on, every state will only be able to propose 
one member of the Commission. After the expansion of the Union to 27 Members, 
the Council will be supposed to set the number of members of the Commission 
lower than the number of members of the Union50. Art. 214 section 2 (new version) 
of the Treaty establishing the European Community regulates that the President of 
the Commission is nominated by the Council with a qualified majority51; until now, 
the governments of the Member States nominated the President by mutual agree­
ment. Moreover, the qualified majority is sufficient for the nomination of the other 
members of the Commission and for the final appointment of the entire Commis­
sion, having been given the approval of the European Parliament. This measure 
itself could reinforce the independence of the Commission towards national inter­
ests if this independence does not result in an inclusion of the division of offices as 
far as the General Directors are concerned. Regardless of this scepticism, the re­
forms promote the development of the Commission towards a managing govern­
ment which exists beside and beneath that of the Council.
Yet, the future equality of all Member States has raised speculation about 
a tighter circle of leaders. The President of the Commission, Prodi52, says that 
a “management” of the big Member states as far as the number of votes is concerned 
(Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy -  the countries which have the highest num­
ber of votes in the Council, i.e. 10, later 29 votes) is not planned. Moreover, the Com­
mission proposed a committee of vice presidents at the summit of Sevilla53. By insti­
tuting such a committee, the Commission would receive a hierarchie structure 
unknown in the past. More importantly, this would elevate the President up above the 
primus inter pares level. This would be a step towards the top of the Union, which is 
not occupied at present.
4. The Creation of a Presidency
Some concepts for the future of the Union call for a President of Europe. The in­
tentions behind these can be summarized by the following terms: unity, representa­
tion and concentration of competences.
50 Cf. Vertrag von Nizza (Fn. 2), Protokoll uber die Erweiterung der Europaischen Union, Art. 4. Auf eine 
ahnliche Regelung zielte bereits der Vorschlag der Komfhission: vgl. Bulletin der Europaischen Union, Beilage 
2/2000, S. 11 ; zu den Ergebnissen Hatje, Die institutionelie Reform der Europaischen Union -  der Vertrag von 
Nizza auf dem Priifstand, in: EuR 2001, S.143,148ff.
51 Der friihere irische MinisterprSsident und der fitihere d&nische Ministerpitsident sollen dagegen vorgeschla- 
gen haben, den PtSsidenten Europas als PrSsidenten der Kommission in allgemeinen, unmittelbaren Wahlen bestimmen 
zu lassen: vgl. Schuller in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 160 vom 13.07.2002.
” Cf. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 139 vom 19.06.2002.
53 Cf. Europaische Kommission, Institutionelie Reform fur eine erfolgreiche Erweiterung (Fn. 23): Bulle­
tin der Europaischen Union, Beilage 2/2000, S. 12 f.
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The idea of unity stems from the Europe-wide conviction that a hierarchic organi­
zation culminates in one point and that a corporation has one head. Hobbes’ Le­
viathan is known as a super-man who consists of many human beings. Following 
rules of legal pragmatics, the Community as a legal person under international law, 
needs in any case a homogeneous outward representation, and the Union would 
gain legal subjectivity by having a President.
Again and again, people criticise Europe for speaking with too many 
voices and not with a single one that could prevail within the concert of global 
politics ruled by hegemonies. The Iraq conflict currently illustrates this statement. 
As far as legal competence is concerned, the heads of the Member States set an 
example for a President of Europe. This leaves the question of power which makes 
the problem urgent which structure to give Europe in the future.
In the beginning of the European Economic Community, the first President 
of the Commission, Hallstein, saw himself in such a position. Also, Delors’ and 
Prodi’s power-conscious leadership points to greater presidial plans. Since the im­
plementation of the European Council, though, the President of the Commission 
acts within the Union together with the heads of the states under changing presi­
dencies and within the Community only in the representative shadow of the chair­
man of the Council who changes from term to term. This reflects the changed rela­
tionship between the Council and the Commission, between national states and the 
Community. Even within the Commission, the President only has the “political 
leadership”, while in all other matters the principle of majority is effective. To be 
the President of Europe, the President of the Commission most importantly needs 
the competence to represent the Union in its relations to the other international 
states and in this connection the competence for the foreign and security policy. 
This competence lies with the Council who for that reason included the office of 
a High Representative into its General Secretariat -  Art. 207 section 2 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community in the version of the Treaty of Nice.
France, Great Britain and Spain, on the other hand, propose a special Head 
of Europe who is to be nominated by the Council and who will essentially be re­
sponsible to the Council. Blair mentioned this concept fairly recently54 when he 
announced a proposal of his own concerning the constitution of the Union. This 
concept marks a national-state integrated solution of the problem which can be 
extended in parliamentary respect by the participation of the European Parliament.
Germany and the big European party-associations, namely the European Party 
of the People, on the other hand, prefer a President with a stronger democratic legiti- 
matization55. The German proposal, to begin with, leans towards the President of the 
Commission. His/Her appointment by the heads of the states should be the result of 
him/her first being elected by the European Parliament, and he/she should be responsi­
ble to the Parliament. The German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fischer, even thinks
* Cf. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 171 vom 26.07.2002.
55 Cf. die Mitteilungen von Lohse in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 166 vom 20.07.2002, und von 
Busse in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 204 vom 03.09.2002
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about a constructive vote of no confidence. This concept is apparently modelled after 
the procedure of appointing the German Chancellor.
The former Irish Prime Minister Bruton added his idea to institute, instead 
of the European Parliament, a committee similar to the German Bundesver- 
sammlung/Federal Assembly, consisting of the representatives of the European 
Parliament plus the same number of members of the national Parliaments. This 
proposal comes close to Giscard d’Estaing’s idea of a special congress.
A remarkable feature of the German proposal are the competences pro­
vided for the European President. He/She is not only to receive the competences 
usually connected with the outward representation but also the competences of the 
High Representative for the foreign and security policy -  at present the Spanish 
Solana -  and the competences of the member of the Commission responsible for 
foreign policy -  now the British Patten, in order to achieve a concentration of the 
foreign policy. This model is called “double-hat” and wants the overcoming of the 
“method Mettemich” by the “method Monnet”56, without aiming for a European 
Federal State.
Sometimes57 the German Bundesprasident/Federal President, whose office 
is marked by the functions of representation and integration, but who participates 
only marginally in the management of the state is taken as a model. Within the 
Union, such a President is to symbolize the European integration and to practice 
certain tasks of mediation and judgement. His/Her being elected by the European 
Parliament would at the same time move the European Parliament forward towards 
integration. Certainly, this model has, in comparison with the alternative model of 
the French President of State, the advantage that the holder of the office does not 
interfere with the balance of powers between the Council and the Commission, 
between politics and bureaucracy and therefore can have the ability of reaching 
a consensus. But this model does not add anything to the solution of the problem of 
an effective, powerful outward representation of the Union, and the competition for 
leadership between the Council and the Commission would not be eliminated.
IV. Unitarization and Federalization of the Union
Whoever compares the organizational structures of the Union and the reform con­
cepts comes to the disillusioning conclusion that for now the way to a united 
Europe is also the strategic objective. As holders of an established sovereignty and 
as “masters” of the Treaties, the national states decide on the further development
56 Lohse und Busse (Fn. 54). Der deutsche Vorschlag kommt dem der Kommission nahe, die Aufgaben 
des Hohen Vertreters und des Kommissars fiir AuBenbeziehungen zusammenzulegen: vgl. Bulletin der Europiis- 
chen Union, Beilage 5/2002, S. 7; allerdings verbindet die Kommission diesen Vorschlag nicht mit dem Amt eines 
Europaprasidenten; sie z5ge aus der Zusammenlegung den regierungsspezifischen Vorteil, die Fiden der gemein- 
samen AuBen- und Sicherheitspolitik in der Hand zu halten.
” Holzinger/Knill, Eine Verfassung fiir die Europaische Union, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 
278 vom 29.11.2000, S. 11.
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of the Union according to their internal interests, which are chiefly the interests of 
their domestic politics. With, in the future, 27 Members of the Union, the opinions 
about what is practical and desirable will vary more than they have done so far. 
The Union’s future will therefore remain in a position of imbalance between unita- 
rization and federalization.
Since the expansion will decrease the supply of common topics and inter­
ests and increase the variety of interests, one can assume that the groups of states 
will come to agreements about their interests in informal, more direct ways outside 
the European order of institutions, as long as the law of the Community does not 
force them to follow its regulations.
The “Europe of two speeds” is an absolutely attractive concept. That even 
the monetary union and the legal framework of the Union’s social order are exe­
cuted in a differentiated way is a well-known fact. Chirac advertised the 
“Avantgarde-group”5* in his Berlin speech, and a short time ago, the Slovakian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kukan, announced that the cooperation between Hun­
gary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia within the Visegrad-Group will be 
continued by these states even after the joining of the Union59. Experts in the his­
tory of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation have nightmares thinking 
about this plan. At least, Art. 17 section 4 of the Treaty on European Union in the 
version of the Treaty of Nice stresses the fact that a “closer cooperation” between 
two or more Member States and in the framework of the West-European Union 
(WEU) and the Atlantic Alliance shall not run counter or impede the cooperation 
provided for in the Treaty on European Union. The Peace of Westphalia contained 
a similar regulation of alliance.
Even today, in spite of all the technical and political problems the main 
objective of the Union should come more clearly into focus: and it is the mainte­
nance of peace in Europe by stabilizing democracy60.
Co może czekać Unię Europejską? 
streszczenie
Pytanie to zadawano sobie już po II wojnie światowej, zwracając uwagę, iż coraz 
ściślejsza integracja będzie stanowić wyzwanie dla państw narodowych, globaliza­
cja wspólnej polityki bezpieczeństwa i zagranicznej -  dla ich polityki i polityków, 
a wzrost integracji i ekspansji Unii stanie się problemem na płaszczyźnie struktu­
ralnej, administracyjnej oraz decyzyjnej dla władz konstytucjonalnych krajów Eu­
ropy.
Omawiając horyzonty rozwoju Unii, Rolf Grawert skupia się następnie na 
podstawach Unii: jej strukturze, zagadnieniach konstytucyjnych -  będących pod­
stawą demokracji i sprawie zarządzania. Osobny obszerny rozdział autor poświęca
" In deutscher Obersetzung abgedruckt in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 147 vom 28.06.2000. 
M Laut Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 208 vom 07.09.2002.
“ Europaische Kommission: vgl. Bulletin der Europaischen Union, Beilage 3/2000, S. 5.
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kwestii sprawowania władzy (corporate governance ~ termin ten zostaje wyjaśnio­
ny jako „sprawowanie władzy korporacyjnej w sensie ogólnym pojęcia”) i jej oce­
nie. Tutaj też pojawia się koncepcja ustanowienia Prezydentury Europejskiej wraz 
z opisami potencjalnego zakresu władzy Prezydenta Europy płynącej z poszcze­
gólnych propozycji i modeli, związanych również z opisanymi w ostatnim rozdzia­
le trendami unitaryzacyjnymi oraz federalistycznymi obecnymi w Europie.
Pracę podsumowuje konkluzja, iż dziś -pomimo nawet wszelkich tech­
nicznych i politycznych problemów -  głównym celem, ku któremu winna zmierzać 
Unia powinno być utrzymanie pokoju w Europie poprzez stabilizację demokracji.
